i thought that was why the nope
― plax (ico), Wednesday, 16 June 2010 19:56 (4 years ago) Permalink
cos its like, pan-religiousy in a fucking marshmallowy meaningless way.
is the point
― plax (ico), Wednesday, 16 June 2010 19:57 (4 years ago) Permalink
ho shit. i thought the donkey-wheel was just meta.
n e ways, plaxico otm
― ultra nate dogg (history mayne), Wednesday, 16 June 2010 19:59 (4 years ago) Permalink
yeah, interdisciplinary work is so fruitless
― ksh, Wednesday, 16 June 2010 20:04 (4 years ago) Permalink
even if you don't consider analytic and continental philosophy to be two separate disciplines—maybe they are, and maybe they aren't—saying that you need to take sides doesn't really make much sense. not saying you can just take random aspects of the two and mash them together, but if you notice a place where the two lines up, you certainly can link them together and work from there
― ksh, Wednesday, 16 June 2010 20:06 (4 years ago) Permalink
seems like u r def. the man to do that good look
― plax (ico), Wednesday, 16 June 2010 20:08 (4 years ago) Permalink
btw, lol that ILX Philosophy thread started discussing Lost less than 50 posts in
― Mordy, Wednesday, 16 June 2010 20:18 (4 years ago) Permalink
Ugh, maybe I won't be looking forward to this thread as I had initially thought. Fucking assholes coming out of the woodwork already.
I don't believe that analytic and continental disciplines can ever be reduced into each other, and nor should they, but to suggest that they cannot both be appreciated is the most disgusting savagery.
― emil.y, Wednesday, 16 June 2010 23:56 (4 years ago) Permalink
I don't think those people are assholes.
― bamcquern, Thursday, 17 June 2010 00:57 (4 years ago) Permalink
Analyze the disgusting savage archetype?
― Mordy, Thursday, 17 June 2010 00:59 (4 years ago) Permalink
I'm just going to treat this as the rolling talk about academics thread, fuck distinctions imo
― dyao, Thursday, 17 June 2010 01:05 (4 years ago) Permalink
anyway, picked up history of sexuality part I, it's actually my first full on foucault book instead of a few scattered essays and excerpts here and there. have only read the prologue but excited
not wanting to put you off or anything, but dunno if history of sexuality is the best place to start w/ foucault - i think it's one of his most esoteric and least satisfying bks, tbh. for me, discipline and punish was a really gd intro to his thought and style - works as a piece of theory and as (obv contentious) history
― Ward Fowler, Thursday, 17 June 2010 06:39 (4 years ago) Permalink
i am so goddamn out of touch w/philosphy these days, i am a bad philo grad. it bugs me, because i think ive lost a lot of what i already knew just through not engaging with it, kind of a tough discipline if you dont stay on top of it.
― ULTRAMAN dat ho (jjjusten), Wednesday, June 16, 2010 1:41 PM (Yesterday) Bookmark Suggest Ban Permalink
^^^^ I double majored and am working in the field of my other major so yeah, I'm stupid again so to speak. Hopefully this thread will bring back that loving feeling of my brain turning inside out.
― peacocks, Thursday, 17 June 2010 18:09 (4 years ago) Permalink
i found history of sexuality I quite satisfying and not as hard to get through as d&p
― harbl, Thursday, 17 June 2010 18:14 (4 years ago) Permalink
i read this really good book called the fountanhead once
― michael, Thursday, 17 June 2010 18:19 (4 years ago) Permalink
wat was it about?
― peacocks, Thursday, 17 June 2010 20:39 (4 years ago) Permalink
how awesome awesome people are
― Mordy, Thursday, 17 June 2010 20:44 (4 years ago) Permalink
i think it was about rape and architecture, kinda like Discipline & Punish, only longer.
― sarahel, Thursday, 17 June 2010 20:50 (4 years ago) Permalink
yeah i woulda said history of sexuality was totally perfect intro to foucault, kinda feel like its both the most developed and clearest version of many of his tropes etc.
― plax (ico), Thursday, 17 June 2010 21:32 (4 years ago) Permalink
the Foucault lecture courses that have been coming out in english translation over the past few years are also great -- I find the lecture format really easy to follow (not that Foucault's other books are particularly offensive in this regard; just sayin'), and there's a lot of great stuff in there
― INSUFFICIENT FUN (bernard snowy), Thursday, 17 June 2010 21:48 (4 years ago) Permalink
lately my reading has been directed more toward early-20th century european philosophy (phenomenology, Diltheyan hermeneutics, various neo-Kantianisms) in an effort to get a better grasp on the origins of the main postwar intellectual (and some political) movements. and maybe to finally understand Heidegger, but I'm not holding my breath.
― INSUFFICIENT FUN (bernard snowy), Thursday, 17 June 2010 21:51 (4 years ago) Permalink
― plax (ico), Thursday, 17 June 2010 21:55 (4 years ago) Permalink
ha, was just about to post that. It's funny because it's true.
I'm currently doing my Masters dissertation in (continental) philosophy, fuck it all I say I'll just get a cosy office job. Altho my reading at this very moment is fun, Jacques Attali's Noise: The Political Economy of Music.
― NYC Goatse.cx and Flowers (Merdeyeux), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:00 (4 years ago) Permalink
really makes me want to read hegel and hausel to understand late heidegger to understand derrida (kinda thought socrates was supposed to be the key to derrida though)
― plax (ico), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:03 (4 years ago) Permalink
That clip is amazing. Also -- loved the Attali. A lot of my undergrad thesis was devoted to him.
― Mordy, Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:05 (4 years ago) Permalink
xpost oh yeah I'm also hoping that, after reading some Husserl, I'll be able to (and still want to, heh) read Derrida's early stuff on him and maybe get a better understanding of JD's whole project
― INSUFFICIENT FUN (bernard snowy), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:08 (4 years ago) Permalink
husserl is awesome but the phenomenological aspects of derrida are crazy confusing to me
― plax (ico), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:13 (4 years ago) Permalink
I saw this thread title and initially thought it would be about best approaches to throwing the D20 in a role playing game.
― he's always been a bit of an anti-climb Max (jon /via/ chi 2.0), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:14 (4 years ago) Permalink
man that clip is my h8ed approach to... everything really. "You can't understand x without y, z, or q". You could say that in any academic discipline, or any non-academic discipline. Fuck it. Secondary texts ftw.
btw another mostly lapsed MA here, although I keep up my subscription to The Philospher's Magazine.
― sent from my neural lace (ledge), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:18 (4 years ago) Permalink
plax what's yr favorite husserl? I'm reading crisis of the european sciences right now but that's obv. a very late and not very representative work so I'm wonderin' what I should check out next.
― INSUFFICIENT FUN (bernard snowy), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:21 (4 years ago) Permalink
i read the cartesian meditations recently enough and its a pretty sweet intro.
― plax (ico), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:24 (4 years ago) Permalink
― INSUFFICIENT FUN (bernard snowy), Thursday, June 17, 2010 5:48 PM (36 minutes ago) Bookmark Suggest Ban Permalink
YES--birth of biopolitics is GREAT i think, not to mention the clearest/'easiest' of any foucault book ive read too.
― max, Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:26 (4 years ago) Permalink
― plax (ico), Thursday, June 17, 2010 6:03 PM (23 minutes ago) Bookmark Suggest Ban Permalink
i thought levinas was the key to derrida
― max, Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:27 (4 years ago) Permalink
i dont even know who that is
― plax (ico), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:28 (4 years ago) Permalink
― max, Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:29 (4 years ago) Permalink
i will never understand derrida
― plax (ico), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:29 (4 years ago) Permalink
― max, Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:30 (4 years ago) Permalink
lithuanian jew, student of husserl (and heidegger i believe?), key concepts 'the other' 'ethics as first philosophy' 'face-to-face' 'alterity'
derrida has two long essays about him--'violence and metaphysics' and a published (extended?) version of the eulogy he gave at levinas funeral
― max, Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:34 (4 years ago) Permalink
the key to derrida fyi is smokin pot and reading poetry
I don't think levinas was a student of heidegger (maybe yr thinkin' of marcuse?), but yeah, he was (I believe) the first french translator of husserl, and in general had a big influence on the french reception of phenomenology
― INSUFFICIENT FUN (bernard snowy), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:36 (4 years ago) Permalink
xpost halfway there; which poetry should I be readin'?
― Mordy, Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:38 (4 years ago) Permalink
well holderlin obv
― max, Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:38 (4 years ago) Permalink
― AESTHOLE (jjjusten), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:39 (4 years ago) Permalink
― max, Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:39 (4 years ago) Permalink
― INSUFFICIENT FUN (bernard snowy), Thursday, 17 June 2010 22:40 (4 years ago) Permalink
yeah tbh I don't want to have to make that distinction & get into talk of modes etc; it's enough to say that the materiality of body for D permits a type of reasoning about bodies that is new, and one whose consequences I, at any rate, lament.
― droit au butt (Euler), Thursday, 13 November 2014 17:33 (2 weeks ago) Permalink
Surely mind-body dualism doesn't begin with Descartes. It had already been around in the Christian tradition alone for centuries by his time.
And I'm still convinced that dualism had anything to do with the Holocaust. How does one get from the belief that mind and body are substantially separate to the view that mass extermination is a morally urgent project? Again, it seems like the intermediate premises there would be doing all the important ideological work. Particularly since people have been dehumanizing and killing one another on large scales for longer than mind-body dualism as a worked-out philosophical position has been around, using whatever justifications are at hand.
Plus, if you're worried about a worldview which says that people are material beings whose preferences can be computed etc., I'd assume you'd have an even bigger problem with the sort of non-dualistic materialism that's been mainstream for a long time now. So what way of thinking about mind and body wouldn't set us on the path to genocide, on your view? Could it all have been avoided if Spinoza had really caught on? Or Berkeley?
― JRN, Thursday, 13 November 2014 20:53 (2 weeks ago) Permalink
re. Cartesian dualism, no. D invents a new anthropology, in particular a new view of the soul, as what "we" are. you can find glimmers of such a first-person pt of view in Augustine, but no more. Thomas is, as you'd expect, an adherent of Aristotelian hylomorphism.
― droit au butt (Euler), Thursday, 13 November 2014 21:17 (2 weeks ago) Permalink
the dehumanizing of the Nazis is unlike any earlier dehumanizing, because of the way the Nazis *reasoned* through it. I'm talking about their focus on efficiency, e.g.
re. materialism. no, you could hold some type of hylomorphism and then the instrumentalization of reason about persons that I'm talking about post-Descartes wouldn't be available. I mean yes this is very hard to imagine because most of us take the Cartesian turn for granted, we learned it when we started breathing, and we don't step out of our shoes very well. maybe a civilization without that turn is nearly inconceivable for us, given our natural conceptual frameworks. but we can try.
― droit au butt (Euler), Thursday, 13 November 2014 21:26 (2 weeks ago) Permalink
I'm trying hard to puzzle through your overall view here. But I'm still getting hung up on the transition from Cartesian dualism, which posits that human beings are essentially immaterial thinking things, to a view of "persons as mere collections of particles, as pieces in a system, whose needs/desires can be computed and optimized". I would think that, if anything, conceiving of people as essentially beyond the reach of inquiry into the physical world would prevent thinking of them as collections of particles whose needs and desires can be computed. Those two views strike me as being in direct contradiction.
(If anything, hylomorphism seems MORE conducive to a view of people as collections of particles whose needs and desires can be computed, since on that view there's no part of a person which is not instantiated materially--right?)
When I raised basically this question earlier, you wrote:
Descartes endorses the view that bodies are mere collections of particles, though; and though "I" am not my body, my body is still pretty important to "I" (particularly if you don't accept that there's an life for your mind once separated from your body). So mind-body dualism legitimizes thinking of bodies as disposable.
But these two sentences strike as being in real tension with one another. Either Carteisan dualism says that the body is still pretty important to "I", or it "legitimizes thinking of bodies as disposable". I don't see how it can do both at once.
And while I don't know a lot about Christian theology, I was under the impression that the soul is traditionally thought of, across a wide variety of major denominations for many centuries up to the present day, as immaterial, an essential part of a person, and the thing that is judged after death and that carries on to the afterlife. And moreover, that the body is both a relatively temporary vessel and a source of sinful urges. Now THAT sounds like a view which might legitimize treating bodies as disposable--after all, it's your soul that gets to be with God for eternity. (I'm sure Christian theologians don't actually endorse that view of human bodies, but neither does Descartes.) It's also a much older and vastly more influential view than anything Descartes came up with, and has a much more plausible claim to being the source of a prevalent 20th (or 21st) century Western worldview.
― JRN, Monday, 17 November 2014 06:00 (1 week ago) Permalink
re. what you're saying about Christian theology, I'm disputing your impression. for instance, the view that the body is a "relatively temporary vessel" is quite modern. the ancient & medieval Christian doctrines maintain the resurrection of the *body* ; *that* is the unit that will be judged and will be saved or condemned.
next:I wrote"Descartes endorses the view that bodies are mere collections of particles, though; and though "I" am not my body, my body is still pretty important to "I" (particularly if you don't accept that there's an life for your mind once separated from your body). So mind-body dualism legitimizes thinking of bodies as disposable."
& you replied
"But these two sentences strike as being in real tension with one another. Either Carteisan dualism says that the body is still pretty important to "I", or it "legitimizes thinking of bodies as disposable". I don't see how it can do both at once."
On the view your body is just a sack of bones inhabited temporarily by your "I", your soul: the question is, what is the *value* of that temporary time? It's obviously of some value! But how much value, given that the soul will perdure eternally, given that all true goods are soul goods? If the answer is, not *that* much value, then it's open to the Cartesian dualist to reason about soul-body fusions as disposable. What's really valuable about this fusion can't be hurt by physical means. So you can reason about these fusions as mere bodies.
― droit au butt (Euler), Monday, 17 November 2014 10:22 (1 week ago) Permalink
philosophers on this thread, when you see something like this (http://www.newappsblog.com/2014/11/taylor-swifts-platonism.html) how does it make you feel about your profession
― a total laugh package (s.clover), Saturday, 22 November 2014 04:49 (6 days ago) Permalink
How modern is the Christian view soul I'm talking about? Post-1641?
It seems like your position on the Descartes thing has shifted a bit. At first you saddled him with some responsibility for a view of "persons as mere collections of particles" etc., but now that I've pointed out how at odds that is with the Cartesian notion of the person, it seems like you're saying that Descartes made possible a view of bodies as disposable, precisely because the person is identified with the immaterial soul, and not the collection of particles to which it's temporarily bound. I hope you can see how this was confusing.
The place you're at with it now does make more sense to me. The question remains, though--what happened between Descartes and the 1930s that allows us to connect him to the Holocaust? Because I don't think the Nazis justified what they did on the grounds that, after all, they were only destroying Jewish bodies, not Jewish souls. Seems like their moral pathology had less to do with a philosophical position on the connection between mind/soul and body and more to do with thinking of Jewish people (and others) as subhuman in the first place. So there's still this big blank to be filled in.
― JRN, Saturday, 22 November 2014 07:49 (6 days ago) Permalink
― droit au butt (Euler), Saturday, 22 November 2014 13:04 (6 days ago) Permalink
to JRN: yeah, thanks for helping me think through this. the view of the soul you're talking about is fully realized in the seventeenth century. was it present earlier? yes, here and there, as people try to puzzle through doctrines and anthropologies. but it becomes widespread in the seventeenth century, & D is giving prominent voice to it.
re. the road to the Holocaust, yes, there are other pieces. but again, I don't think that's what's novel about the Holocaust is mere genocide; as you pointed out earlier, that's been around for centuries. what's new is how the Nazis reasoned about their killing; that's to say, their means of dehumanizing was new. & their reasoning, in which they instrumentalized their victims' lives, has roots in the Cartesian turn. much is missing from that! I'm not saying D invented Nazi fascism. but Nazi fascism is one unfolding of "the modern turn" that should not appear, in retrospect, unintelligible from within Western conceptual frameworks.
I feel like what I'm saying here is really kinda rote so push back!
― droit au butt (Euler), Saturday, 22 November 2014 13:17 (6 days ago) Permalink
I'm reading Geertz's The Interpretation of Cultures. He has these occasional polemics on philosophy that I really like.
The concepts used here, ethos and world view, are vague and imprecise; they are a kind of prototheory, forerunners, it is to be hoped, of a more adequate analytical framework. But even with them, anthropologists are beginning to develop an approach to the study of values which can clarify rather than obscure the essential processes involved in the normative regulation of behavior. One almost certain result of such an empirically oriented, theoretically sophisticated, symbol-stressing approach to the study of values is the decline of analyses which attempt to describe moral, aesthetic, and other normative activities in terms of theories based not on the observation of such activities but on logical considerations alone. Like bees who fly despite theories of aeronautics which deny them the right to do so, probably the overwhelming majority of mankind are continually drawing normative conclusions from factual premises (and factual conclusions from normative premises, for the relation between ethos and world view is circular) despite refined, and in their own terms impeccable, reflections by professional philosophers on the "naturalistic fallacy." An approach to a theory of value which looks toward the behavior of actual people in actual societies living in terms of actual cultures for both its stimulus and its validation will turn us away from abstract and rather scholastic arguments in which a limited number of classical positions are stated again and again with little that is new to recommend them, to a process of ever-increasing insight into both what values are and how they work. Once this enterprise in the scientific analysis of values is well launched, the philosophical discussions of ethics are likely to take on more point. The process is not that of replacing moral philosophy by descriptive ethics, but of providing moral philosophy with an empirical base and a conceptual framework which is somewhat advanced over that available to Aristotle, Spinoza, or G. E. Moore. The role of such a special science as anthropology in the analysis of values is not to replace philosophical investigation, but to make it relevant.
That's from 1957, and I only have a fuzzy impression of what value theory at that time looked like. I assume a lot of modern-day value theorists would be on-board, or at least pay lip service to the need for naturalistic grounding, albeit maybe crediting psychology rather than anthropology as a more reliable empirical base.
― jmm, Saturday, 22 November 2014 14:25 (6 days ago) Permalink
i picked up Alexander Galloway's new book on Laurelle. hoping i'll get more out of it than the 2/3rds of Principles of Non-Philosophy that I read so i can make up my mind if L is worth my time/effort or not.
also reading Brian Massumi's "A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia" as a kind of warm-up to (finally!) reading "Anti-Oedipus."
― ryan, Saturday, 22 November 2014 14:37 (6 days ago) Permalink
In my limited experience, I have never really found anything useful in Laruelle (though I've only read some of his essays, not his books), but his followers are so devoted I feel like there must be something there, while at the same time I find his prose so extraordinarily tortuous and opaque (and I say this as someone who finds a fair amount of writing in continental philosophy to be weirdly seductive) that it's hard for me to summon the will to persist. I'd be interested to see if the Galloway book is enlightening. I like Massumi's User's Guide but I think it might be more relevant to A Thousand Plateaus (the User's Guide started out as the long preface to the translation of ATP that Massumi prepared as a dissertation at Yale, iirc).
― one way street, Sunday, 23 November 2014 19:14 (5 days ago) Permalink
yeah as I was saying unthread L is a uniquely bad writer, I think. Derrida's pointed questions to him (also upthread) struck me as pretty otm. There's also something to be said for the exhaustion of philosophy in the continental tradition (hence the need for non-philosophy) being itself close to exhaustion.
― ryan, Sunday, 23 November 2014 19:19 (5 days ago) Permalink
Yeah, Derrida's objections seem pretty decisive. That dialogue slipped by me, so thanks for bringing it up.
― one way street, Monday, 24 November 2014 00:46 (4 days ago) Permalink
Laruelle kind of sounds like a parody of continental philosophy; philosophy reduced entirely to self-reflection.
― jmm, Monday, 24 November 2014 15:53 (4 days ago) Permalink