North Korea must choose either to have a future or to have nuclear weapons "but it cannot have them both"

I'm astoundingly blase myself. Like this wasn't going to happen?

Admittedly some people apparently didn't. Blogtrawling calls up the usual amount of bluster and paranoia but what's also been striking is the bodycheck the Bush supporters that possess some form of memory just got handed and are admitting to. Thus dear Mr. Goldberg:

Lots of folks think this nuke thing is good news for the GOP because it puts national security in play and diminishes the Foley stuff. As political analysis, I think that's probably right. But let's keep in mind that North Korea's nuke testing constitutes a failure of US policy. We can debate the details and the extenuating circumstances, but President Bush denounced the Axis of Evil five years ago and promised that he would do everything to keep its members from getting nukes. Well, North Korea just detonated one. Iran is well on its way to getting one. And Iraq, well, that's not quite the bright spot we hoped it would be.

Stratfor's been going crazy, of course. Their latest mailout:

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The reported detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea on Oct. 9 raises the question of potential military action against North Korea. The rationale for such a strike would be simple. North Korea, given its rhetoric, cannot be allowed to have nuclear weapons. Therefore, an attack to deny them the facilities with which to convert their device into a weapon and deploy it is essential. If such an attack were to take place, it is assumed, the United States would play the dominant or even sole role.

This scenario assumes that North Korea is as aggressive as its rhetoric.

But what about North Korea's well-armed neighbors -- Russia, China, South Korea, Japan? Would they not be willing to assume the major burden of an attack against North Korea? Is the United States really willing to go it alone, even while engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Leaving these obvious political questions aside for the moment, let's reverse the issue by posing it in military terms: What would a U.S. strike against North Korea look like?

The USS Kitty Hawk is currently sitting in port at Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan. The USS Enterprise is operating in the Arabian Sea, while the Nimitz and the Stennis are conducting exercises off the coast of California. All are an ocean away, and none is less than a week's transit from the region. Nevertheless, naval cruise missiles are readily available, as are long-range strikes by B-2A Spirit stealth bombers and B-52H Stratofortresses and B-1B Lancers currently supporting NATO operations in Afghanistan out of Diego Garcia. A more robust strike package would take longer to deploy.

When U.S. military planners have nightmares, they have nightmares about war with North Korea. Even the idea of limited strikes against the isolated nation is fraught with potential escalations. The problem is the mission. A limited attack against nuclear facilities might destabilize North Korea or lead North Korea to the conclusion that the United States would intend regime change.

Regime preservation is the entire point of its nuclear capability. Therefore, it is quite conceivable that Kim Jong-Il and his advisors -- or other factions --might construe even the most limited military strikes against targets directly related to missile development or a nuclear program as an act threatening the regime, and therefore one that necessitates a fierce response. Regime survival could very easily entail a full, unlimited reprisal by the Korean People's Army (KPA) to any military strike whatsoever on North Korean soil.

North Korea has some 10,000 fortified artillery pieces trained on Seoul. It is essential to understand that South Korea's capital city, a major population center and the industrial heartland of South Korea, is within range of conventional artillery. The United States has been moving its forces out of range of these guns, but the South Koreans cannot move their capital.

Add to this the fact that North Korea has more than 100 No-Dong missiles that can reach deep into South Korea, as well as to Japan, and we can see that the possibility for retaliation is very real. Although the No-Dong has not always been the most reliable weapon, just the possibility of dozens of strikes against U.S. forces in Korea and other cities in Korea and Japan presents a daunting scenario.

North Korea has cultivated a reputation for unpredictability. Although it has been fairly conservative in its actions compared to its rhetoric, the fact is that no one can predict North Korea's response to strikes against its nuclear facilities. And with Seoul at risk -- a city of 20 million people -- the ability to take risks is limited.

The United States must assume, for the sake of planning, that U.S. airstrikes would be followed by massed artillery fire on Seoul. Now, massed artillery is itself not immune to countermeasures. But North Korea's artillery lies deep inside caves and fortifications all along the western section of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). An air campaign against these guns would take a long time, during which enormous damage would be done to Seoul and the South Korean economy -- perhaps on the order of several hundred thousand high-explosive rounds per hour. Even using tactical nuclear weapons against this artillery would pose serious threats to Seoul. The radiation from even low-yield weapons could force the evacuation of the city.

The option of moving north into the North Korean defensive belt is an option, but an enormously costly one. North Korea has a huge army and, on the defensive, it can be formidable. Fifty years of concerted military fortification would make Hezbollah's preparations in southern Lebanon look like child's play. Moving U.S. and South Korean armor into this defensive belt could break it, but only with substantial casualties and without the certainty of success. A massive stalemate along the DMZ, if it developed, would work in favor of the larger, defensive force.

Moreover, the North Koreans would have the option of moving south. Now, in U.S. thinking, this is the ideal scenario. The North Korean force on the move, outside of its fortifications, would be vulnerable to U.S. and South Korean airstrikes and superior ground maneuver and fire capabilities. In most war games, the defeat of North Korea requires the KPA to move south, exposing itself to counterstrikes.

However, the same war-gaming has also supposed at least 30 days for the activation and mobilization of U.S. forces for a counterattack. U.S. and South Korean forces would maintain an elastic defense against the North; as in the first war, forces would be rushed into the region, stabilizing the front, and then a counterattack would develop, breaking the North Korean army and allowing a move north.

There are three problems with this strategy. The first is that the elastic strategy would inevitably lead to the fall of Seoul and, if the 1950 model were a guide, a much deeper withdrawal along the Korean Peninsula. Second, the ability of the U.S. Army to deploy substantial forces to Korea within a 30-day window is highly dubious. Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom both required much longer periods of time.

Finally, the U.S. Army is already fighting two major ground wars and is stretched to the breaking point. The rotation schedule is now so tight that units are already spending more time in Iraq than they are home between rotations. The idea that the U.S. Army has a multidivisional force available for deployment in South Korea would require a national mobilization not seen since the last Korean War.

It comes down to this: If the United States strikes at North Korea's nuclear capabilities, it does so placing a bet. And that bet is that North Korea will not respond. That might be true, but if it is not true, it poses a battlefield problem to which neither South Korea nor the United States will be able to respond. In one scenario, the North Koreans bombard Seoul and the United States makes a doomed attempt at shutting down the massive artillery barrage. By the time the guns are silenced -- even in the best-case scenarios -- Seoul will be a mess. In another scenario, the North Korean army executes an offensive of even minimal competence, which costs South Korea its capital and industrial heartland. The third is a guerrilla onslaught from the elite of the North Korean Army, deployed by mini-subs and tunnels under the DMZ. The guerrillas pour into the south and wreak havoc on U.S. military installations.

That is how a U.S. strike -- and its outcome -- might look. Now, what about the Chinese and Russians? They are, of course, not likely to support such a U.S. attack (and could even supply North Korea in an extended war). Add in the fact that South Korea would not be willing to risk destroying Seoul and you arrive at a situation where even a U.S. nuclear strike against nuclear and non-nuclear targets would pose an unacceptable threat to South Korea.

There are two advantages the United States has. The first is time. There is a huge difference between a nuclear device and a deployable nuclear weapon. The latter has to be shaped into a small, rugged package able to be launched on a missile or dropped from a plane. Causing atomic fission is not the same as having a weapon.

The second advantage is distance. The United States is safe and far away from North Korea. Four other powers -- Russia, China, South Korea and Japan -- have much more to fear from North Korea than the United States does. The United States will always act unilaterally if it feels that it has no other way to protect its national interest. As it is, however, U.S. national interest is not at stake.

South Korea faces nothing less than national destruction in an all-out war. South Korea knows this and it will vigorously oppose any overt military action. Nor does China profit from a destabilized North Korea and a heavy-handed U.S. military move in its backyard. Nevertheless, if North Korea is a threat, it is first a threat to its immediate neighbors, one or more of whom can deal with North Korea.

In the end, North Korea wants regime survival. In the end, allowing the North Koran regime to survive is something that has been acceptable for over half a century. When you play out the options, the acquisition of a nuclear device -- especially one neither robust nor deployable -- does not, by itself, compel the United States to act, nor does it give the United States a militarily satisfactory option. The most important issue is the transfer of North Korean nuclear technology to other countries and groups. That is something the six-party talk participants have an equal interest in and might have the leverage to prevent.

Every situation does not have a satisfactory military solution. This seems to be one of them.

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I live within range of NK's missles, and to me it doesn't seem like an odd choice of things to worry about at all.

http://www.japantoday.com/jp/
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/
http://mdn.mainichi-msn.co.jp/

I hope I'm right, but I'm guessing that North Korea will be talked out of doing anything in the meantime, like in the past. The stakes have been raised now, yes, but if not the U.S., South Korea and Japan are going to be even more vigilant as fuck now.

That's that sorted then.

Genuine question: Is it realistic to be concerned about an attack on South Korea? I mean, North Korea has had the army to do it for a while, a using the one nuke you have on Seoul isn't going to get rid of the South Korean military.

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2006_10/009701.php
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002832.html
http://www.theadventuresofchester.com/archives/2006/10/was_the_nuke_te.html

As the Stratfor article notes, the only reason for this test was to ensure NK's regime survival. It will survive, without a doubt.

Every situation does not have a satisfactory military solution. This seems to be one of them.

I don't believe any situation has a purely military or purely diplomatic solution; it's precisely in the dosing of soft and hard power and in the strategy and tactics that one achieves goals or doesn't. However, the tough guy stance that the conservatives so love, especially whe it translates into a 'fuck you, I ain't talking to you' one hasn't worked any better with the Palestinians and N. Korea than Clinton's supposedly touchy-feely engagement. The usual procdure is divide and conquer, instead he's made bedfellows of Venezuela and Iran, and neither Russia nor China are inclined to allow the U.S. any more U.N. sanctioned adventures - at a time when there may be serious security concerns in N.K. and Iran and when the Sudanese govt. is cynically comparing the prosepct of U.N. peacekeepers to imperialists while a local population of the wrong religion is being slaughtered.

I've said it before and I'll say it again, and I frankly don't see a hell of a lot better strategizing and long-term thinking from the Dems, but this administration couldn't organize a piss-up in a beer tent.

And The Daily Mirror: KIM WILD.

British tabloids - best in the world, blah blah blah.

http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/10/09/un.vote.reut/index.html

really? wonder what the japanese have to say about that.

Josh Marshall notes that the question of whether or not this was a nuclear blast is now in the NY Times, and is apparently getting more play in the non-U.S. media.

Like?

I gotta be honest, I see next to nothing that could act stop North Korea from getting nukes precisely because nobody knows what to do to do so. I'm treating it more as an inevitability.

Good point, but if Japan remilitarizes to counter a percieved threat from NK, all bets are off. The Chinese still hate Japan so much that they might be willing to risk a lot to humble their old enemies.

I'll be following this closely. We needn't have interfered with Korea in the first place, but if there's anything the U.S loves, it's reinforcing a mistake.

But on the other hand, who gives a fuck? We're not going to do anything about it. No one is. Wake me up when the Chinese and Rooskies get pissed.

or what super cub said:
I don't advocate anything. I don't think NK would use them, but that's not the point. The US and others will not tolerate a nuclear NK. That means either war or strangling the regime. Either course could have disastrous results.

Do you think that it's irrelevant whether the test was successful or not?

where does it differ?

Second, I don't think the Bush Administration's policy failure in re:Korea is all that debatable

what's your point?

Third, I don't think that one stupid sentence carries the weight that you're giving it.

it was the entire point of his post. and the post that he posted following the one we're discussing.

Do you think that it's irrelevant whether the test was successful or not?

barely.

"KFA eCommerce solutions"

http://www.korea-dpr.com/catalog2/

http://www.korea-dpr.com/catalog2/images/IMG_0013.jpg

This: Oh, so if it was just a small nuke detonation we can just disregard it? So if they tried to attempt to blow up a bomb and failed, we can rest easy? Only the likes of Josh Marshall would proffer something so inane

is not equal to this: Marshall is noting that maybe the test was a total failure, which allows him to crow that Jong-Ill is as incompetent as Bush. Which means that Marshall, as usual, is picking an inane partisan victory over reality,

in any way, at all. Two completely different points.

Second, yeah, you're right that Marhsall appears to be engaging in a little bit of Bush-bashing in that second post. But so what?
As I indicated, the failure of Bush admin NK policy is pretty much nondebatable, and although you claimed not to get my point on that, I'm not sure how you could possibly have missed it.

Anyway, I didn't link to Marshall because of his analysis; I linked to him because he demonstrated that the "Dud" theory had gone mainstream.
The real dispute between us is that you don't seem to think that the failure of the test matters; the more I think about it, the more I disagree, actually. Any sort of sound diplomacy has to be based upon a realistic understanding of your opponent's strengths and weaknesses. While I don't really expect the Bush admin to actually engage with NK (a point on which we apparently agree), if those two sides were to come to the table it makes a difference.

Finally, it appears that the Chinese may well allow the UN Security Council to impose sanctions for the test. Seems to me that the success/failure of the test should have some impact on what those sanctions look like.

I don't see the point of the Bush bashing by Marshall in this situation given that a) Marshall does it all the time; b) it adds nothing to the debate, in context or otherwise; c) Marshall trivializes the action of North Korea by conflating Bush policy with technical ineptitude; d) he appears much more happy to present this as insight rather than simply that the dud theory is going mainstream. His next post, which I referenced, reinforces this.

Any sort of sound diplomacy has to be based upon a realistic understanding of your opponent's strengths and weaknesses. While I don't really expect the Bush admin to actually engage with NK (a point on which we apparently agree), if those two sides were to come to the table it makes a difference.

I don't honestly think that the rest of the world is excited to hedge its bets for more time, to let North Korea continue blowing shit up underground until they get it right, before we hold hands and decide that the 4th largest army is now an honest threat to stability instead of a blowhard with a bad attitude. That's why I think it barely matters that the bomb may have been a dud. Either we are going to recognize a growing threat and use THIS action as our leverage or we are going to wait until they lob another missile over Japan or rattle the cages in China. We don't know how successful the test was, so I'm not really sure we can negotiate effectively.

Part of the reason that the Bush administration doesn't want to negotiate directly with North Korea is because a) that's what the North Koreans have demanded and b) the administration knows the complexity of the situation and would much rather build consensus from the original six nations that we were dealing with a couple of years ago.

Nobody wants a power vacuum in the NK. Even though technically there will be one as soon as South Korea and China simultaneously admit to it. KJI and the DPRK Military are like Schrodingers's cat.

The reason nobody wants a power vacuum is because nobody knows how to carve up the territory. the ROK wants 100%, I'm sure, but they don't want to pay for assimilating medieval East Germany. PRC probably doesn't want SK all up ins, they probably want some little chunk up north to put radar stations closer to the FSU or some shit, Japan doesn't want China any closer than they already are, and they all basically hate each other as much or more than they hate the old tubby drunkard with his No-Dong and his A-Dud.

We barely even have a dog in this fight anymore. Japan's rebuilt, ROK has their own well-equipped military, China's run by the Capitalist Party and will probably just buy Taiwan outright in a decade or two. Oh and we have no money and the military spends all their time in The Suck. We ought to tell the three of them to figure it the fuck out on their own time and admit we don't have the time to play Daddy.

That's all fine and good, except there is the issue of proliferation to think about.