A New Thread fot the Current Israel/Palestine/Lebanon mess

There is a vast difference -- both moral and legal -- between a two-year-old baby who is killed by an enemy rocket and a 30-year-old civilian who has allowed his house to be used to store Katyusha rockets.

clearly written to vilify lebanese and sanctify israelis. so fucking gross.

revolutionary war aside, heh.

the leaking of the internal police report on the bombing during the 1970s proved that a warning had indeed been received. However, the report claimed that the warning was only just being delivered to the officer in charge as the bomb went off.

I came across it here fwiw: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerrilla_warfare#Guerrillas_in_Israel_and_the_Palestinian_Territories

Anyway, the interesting point is the modern Israeli perception of the hotel bombing.

I also don't really think the hotel bombing ought to be cause for party time.

Some -- those who cannot leave on their own -- can be counted among the innocent victims of the Hezbollah attacks and the predictable counter-attacks.

Ham-fisted buck-passing. Israel's response was so predictable, so expected, it's as if Hez blew up those Lebanese people themselves!

see, that is the main problem: israel will never do this as it will be an admission of guilt for past crimes. there is never going to be a mandela-type moment for this to happen, or perhaps it passed with rabin's assassination (thanks right wing settlers!).

So, Hezbollah; have been called a terrorist organization, mostly in the US because of their history of kidnappings and the Marine Beirut attack - have their methods changed, and they are no longer terrorists, but just a rogue militia?

As Hurting pointed out, targeting civilians is a major factor in determining terrorism (rather than killing/injuring civilians via collateral damage). Though would demoralizing yet ineffectual strikes against a military force also be characterized as such? How about the Weathermen, who targeted government buildings but only bombed them at night to avoid civilian casualties? I guess the goal is to spread "terror," but how does that differ from a "shock and awe"-type demoralization of an enemy?

I've been reflecting on the "imagine a political party in Canda started bombing the US" used to defend Israel's actions, and I think it's problematic. How about this one: a housing project has a large number of gang members that are controlling a neighborhood via violent means. Is it morally justified to drop a bomb on the housing complex in order to weaken them? That's the root of the "proportionality" argument, I think.

There is a reason why General Sherman said "war is hell" more than a century ago. But he helped end the Civil War with his devastating march through Georgia — not by cease fires or bowing to "world opinion" and there were no corrupt busybodies like the United Nations to demand replacing military force with diplomacy.

Goldberg is on vacation, apparently, so that's not totally surprising.

he's also 100% convinced that every single one of Israel's neighbors would like to see them pushed into the ocean.

this seems to conveniently miss a major theme of Sherman's speech - that the most bloodthirsty are those who never fight.

ter·ror·ism n.
The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons.

UNLESS Hezbollah are intentionally attacking civilians (which they might be, but I am more in line with Hurting's suggestion that they either lack control over their missiles or just don't care who they hit, which in my opinion is slightly different from intentionally targeting civilians) they are, by dictionary definition, a guerrilla/paramilitary force with regards to their CURRENT actions, although in the past they have engaged in terrorist activity.

The ground war has begun. Several Israeli brigades now appear to be operating between the Lebanese border and the Litani River. According to reports, Hezbollah forces are dispersed in multiple bunker complexes and are launching rockets from these and other locations.

Hezbollah's strategy appears to be threefold. First, force Israel into costly attacks against prepared fortifications. Second, draw Israeli troops as deeply into Lebanon as possible, forcing them to fight on extended supply lines. Third, move into an Iraqi-style insurgency from which Israel -- out of fear of a resumption of rocket attacks -- cannot withdraw, but which the Israelis also cannot endure because of extended long-term casualties. This appears to have been a carefully planned strategy, built around a threat to Israeli cities that Israel can't afford. The war has begun at Hezbollah's time and choosing.

Israel is caught between three strategic imperatives. First, it must end the threat to Israeli cities, which must involve the destruction of Hezbollah's launch capabilities south of the Litani River. Second, it must try to destroy Hezbollah's infrastructure, which means it must move into the Bekaa Valley and as far as the southern suburbs of Beirut. Third, it must do so in such a way that it is not dragged into a long-term, unsustainable occupation against a capable insurgency.

Hezbollah has implemented its strategy by turning southern Lebanon into a military stronghold, consisting of well-designed bunkers that serve both as fire bases and launch facilities for rockets. The militants appear to be armed with anti-tank weapons and probably anti-aircraft weapons, some of which appear to be of American origin, raising the question of how they were acquired. Hezbollah wants to draw Israel into protracted fighting in this area in order to inflict maximum casualties and to change the psychological equation for both military and political reasons.

Israelis historically do not like to fight positional warfare. Their tendency has been to bypass fortified areas, pushing the fight to the rear in order to disrupt logistics, isolate fortifications and wait for capitulation. This has worked in the past. It is not clear that it will work here. The great unknown is the resilience of Hezbollah's fighters. To this point, there is no reason to doubt it. Israel could be fighting the most resilient and well-motivated opposition force in its history. But the truth is that neither Israel nor Hezbollah really knows what performance will be like under pressure.

Simply occupying the border-Litani area will not achieve any of Israel's strategic goals. Hezbollah still would be able to use rockets against Israel. And even if, for Hezbollah, this area is lost, its capabilities in the Bekaa Valley and southern Beirut will remain intact. Therefore, a battle that focuses solely on the south is not an option for Israel, unless the Israelis feel a defeat here will sap Hezbollah's will to resist. We doubt this to be the case.

The key to the campaign is to understand that Hezbollah has made its strategic decisions. It will not be fighting a mobile war. Israel has lost the strategic initiative: It must fight when Hezbollah has chosen and deal with Hezbollah's challenge. However, given this, Israel does have an operational choice. It can move in a sequential fashion, dealing first with southern Lebanon and then with other issues. It can bypass southern Lebanon and move into the rear areas, returning to southern Lebanon when it is ready. It can attempt to deal with southern Lebanon in detail, while mounting mobile operations in the Bekaa Valley, in the coastal regions and toward south Beirut, or both at the same time.

There are resource and logistical issues involved. Moving simultaneously on all three fronts will put substantial strains on Israel's logistical capability. An encirclement westward on the north side of the Litani, followed by a move toward Beirut while the southern side of the Litani is not secured, poses a serious challenge in re-supply. Moving into the Bekaa means leaving a flank open to the Syrians. We doubt Syria will hit that flank, but then, we don't have to live with the consequences of an intelligence failure. Israel will be sending a lot of force on that line if it chooses that method. Again, since many roads in south Lebanon will not be secure, that limits logistics.

Israel is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Hezbollah has created a situation in which Israel must fight the kind of war it likes the least -- attritional, tactical operations against prepared forces -- or go to the war it prefers, mobile operations, with logistical constraints that make these operations more difficult and dangerous. Moreover, if it does this, it increases the time during which Israeli cities remain under threat. Given clear failures in appreciating Hezbollah's capabilities, Israel must take seriously the possibility that Hezbollah has longer-ranged, anti-personnel rockets that it will use while under attack.

Israel has been trying to break the back of Hezbollah resistance in the south through air attack, special operations and probing attacks. This clearly hasn't worked thus far. That does not mean it won't work, as Israel applies more force to the problem and starts to master the architecture of Hezbollah's tactical and operational structure; however, Israel can't count on a rapid resolution of that problem.

The Israelis have by now thought the problem through. They don't like operational compromises -- preferring highly focused solutions at the center of gravity of an enemy. Hezbollah has tried to deny Israel a center of gravity and may have succeeded, forcing Israel into a compromise position. Repeated assaults against prepared positions are simply not something the Israelis can do, because they cannot afford casualties. They always have preferred mobile encirclement or attacks at the center of gravity of a defensive position. But at this moment, viewed from the outside, this is not an option.

An extended engagement in southern Lebanon is the least likely path, in our opinion. More likely -- and this is a guess -- is a five-part strategy:

1. Insert airmobile and airborne forces north of the Litani to seal the rear of Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon. Apply air power and engineering forces to reduce the fortifications, and infantry to attack forces not in fortified positions. Bottle them up, and systematically reduce the force with limited exposure to the attackers.

2. Secure roads along the eastern flank for an armored thrust deep into the Bekaa Valley to engage the main Hezbollah force and infrastructure there. This would involve a move from Qiryat Shimona north into the Bekaa, bypassing the Litani to the west, and would probably require sending airmobile and special forces to secure the high ground. It also would leave the right flank exposed to Syria.

3. Use air power and special forces to undermine Hezbollah capabilities in the southern Beirut area. The Israelis would consider a move into this area after roads through southern Lebanon are cleared and Bekaa relatively secured, moving into the area, only if absolutely necessary, on two axes of attack.

4. Having defeated Hezbollah in detail, withdraw under a political settlement shifting defense responsibility to the Lebanese government.

5. Do all of this while the United States is still able to provide top cover against diplomatic initiatives that will create an increasingly difficult international environment.

There can be many variations on this theme, but these elements are inevitable:

1. Hezbollah cannot be defeated without entering the Bekaa Valley, at the very least.

2. At some point, resistance in southern Lebanon must be dealt with, regardless of the cost.

3. Rocket attacks against northern Israel and even Tel Aviv must be accepted while the campaign unfolds.

4. The real challenge will come when Israel tries to withdraw.

No. 4 is the real challenge. Destruction of Hezbollah's infrastructure does not mean annihilation of the force. If Israel withdraws, Hezbollah or a successor organization will regroup. If Israel remains, it can wind up in the position the United States is in Iraq. This is exactly what Hezbollah wants. So, Israel can buy time, or Israel can occupy and pay the cost. One or the other.

The other solution is to shift the occupational burden to another power that is motivated to prevent the re-emergence of an anti-Israeli military force -- as that is what Hezbollah has become. The Lebanese government is the only possible alternative, but not a particularly capable one, reflecting the deep rifts in Lebanon.

Israel has one other choice, which is to extend the campaign to defeat Syria as well. Israel can do this, but the successor regime to Syrian President Bashar al Assad likely would be much worse for Israel than al Assad has been. Israel can imagine occupying Syria; it can't do it. Syria is too big and the Arabs have learned from the Iraqis how to deal with an occupation. Israel cannot live with a successor to al Assad and it cannot take control of Syria. It will have to live with al Assad. And that means an occupation of Lebanon would always be hostage to Syrian support for insurgents.

Hezbollah has dealt Israel a difficult hand. It has thought through the battle problem as well as the political dimension carefully. Somewhere in this, there has been either an Israeli intelligence failure or a political failure to listen to intelligence. Hezbollah's capabilities have posed a problem for Israel that allowed Hezbollah to start a war at a time and in a way of its choosing. The inquest will come later in Israel. And Hezbollah will likely be shattered regardless of its planning. The correlation of forces does not favor it. But if it forces Israel not only to defeat its main force but also to occupy, Hezbollah will have achieved its goals.

are the dealings and activities of terrorist cells as much of an open secret as those of gangs and gang members? since secrecy is such a huge part of terrorism/resistance movements/etc., i'm guessing the average terrorist's friends and neighbors aren't totally informed of his affiliations.

which, of course, makes civilian casualties even more regrettable, since the inhabitants of a given apartment building might have had no idea they were sharing the laundry room with Terrorist HQ.

(too bad the RaptureReady bulletin board has been removed)

Both Palmerston in 1862 and Napoléon III in January 1863 proposed to mediate beween the two sides, though by '64 no-one was.

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-8784648057807730825&q=tvshow%3ACharlie_Rose

Are you joking? Where are you getting your news? A quarter of a million people have been sitting in bomb shelters for a week, and according to this Haaretz article, 30-50% of northerners have left their homes:

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/741126.html

as for where i get my news, i get it from ILX!

The displaced Lebanese are the bigger story in part because their plight is linked with the tens of thousands of foreign ex-pats that are being evacuated simultaneously, the latter being a story that directly affects a lot of other countries. And given the current situation, I don't think many people have permanently displaced on either side. Doesn't "permanent" displacement imply widespread destruction of entire towns and villages? If that was the case, wouldn't there be a *lot* more than 270-odd deaths in Lebanon, as in at least 50 times that number? I think almost everyone who has left will be able to return if they want to, although who knows when that will be.

-- Jessie the Monster (scarymonsterrr...), July 21st, 2006.

i don't think this makes sense. if you fire rockets that you can't target with any accuracy into civilian areas, you are intentionally killing civilians.

i'm not sure why we're all hung up on whether hizbollah is terrorist/guerilla/militia/ whatever. changing the wording doesn't make a bit of difference. if you don't think much of what a militia is setting out to achieve, how does it matter that they're a militia and not terrorists?