― dave q, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
― Andrew L, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
― stevo, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
― Tracer Hand, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
― Ronan, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
― Michael Daddino, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
― J Blount, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
― Emma, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
The glue-sniffing thing is actually not a very good point, for about a thousand different reasons starting with its not being possible and ending with it not being preferable anyway.
― nabisco%%, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
― Dan Perry, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
The Northwestern precedent was indeed eerie: one success was, you know, news, but after a while it started to seem more like an annual class project to expose a wrongfully-convicted man on death row -- a task which should not, in theory, be nearly so easy. One imagines that if there were an upcoming turnaround on the death penalty history textbooks of the future would mention that course as the changing point. Unfortunately I don't expect a death-penality turnaround anytime during my lifetime, as American moralism and indignation and impotent rage over the concept of free- floating "crime" consistently trump the increasingly-clear evidence that administration of the death penality is entirely fucked.
― Nathan Barley, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
― DG, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
― anthony, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
I mean, the thing I like about the Foucault analysis of something like this is the way that its attacks on the idea of a pure rationalistic truth are less useful as actual attacks on rationalistic truth but as supports of it: the mere fact of our realizing the fallibility and bias and power dynamics at a system's core in and of itself makes those failures and biases and power dynamics less powerful. The more convinced we become that we can never reach and stable and coherent legalistic "truth," the closer we come to approximating one. So in this sense it might be best to treat ourselves as children -- as a way of detecting and reversing some of our more childish impulses.
― Kris, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
An event takes place, say, a murder. The rationalist model would be that we humans can create a system in which we very objectively look at all of the evidence and come to mostly-unimpeachable logical conclusions about what exactly happened: each part of the system performs its function rationally and in the end a coherent and "provable" explanation is reached (e.g., "that guy did it"). (Part of) Foucaut's thinking was that this is basically not the case: his model was that once the event has taken place, all parties related to the event develop a "discourse" with which to explain it, but each party develops a discourse that's most suited to its own particular needs or agenda -- and these discourses are pliant and flexible enough that they can be adapted around both "factual" evidence and competing discourses to maintain some sort of interpretation that serves the needs of the speaker. In the end, he would have said, what we wind up viewing as "the truth," as "what really happened," isn't some sort of rational provable certainty but really the product of all of these various discourses competing and one of them winning, and winning not based on a just "reality" but on the amount of power placed behind it. Super-oversimplified summary: truth isn't "truth" but is basically constructed to serve certain purposes -- the purposes of whoever was most powerful and successful in making their interpretation the dominant one. (You know, you know: history is written by the winners, etc.)
This gets really complicated when applied to criminal justice now, though, because in some sense that sort of Foucauldian thinking is at the root of it. The earlier model for a "court" was really basically an inquiry, wherein the representatives of the state supposedly objectively collected facts and testimony and evidence and then made rulings. But contemporary courts are all about acknowledging the competition of discourses and their competition, to the point where we view trials as fundamentally unjust if, say, one of the discursive parties (defense attorney) somehow lapses in presenting his discourse, regardless of "facts." And I'd argue that this makes our system more just (if more complicated) than the inquiry model.
It's sort of like Pragmatism, where it's argued that no matter how Skeptical we want to be about positive "reality" the fact remains that certain courses of action serve purposes well and certain courses of action don't (it doesn't matter whether my car keys "exist" so long as they consistently start my car); we have to be both hugely skeptical of the justice system and yet uphold it at the same time.
"Reprieve for the Retarded"
It just reads so... darn mean!
― BRianR, Friday, 21 June 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)
― Tracer Hand, Monday, 1 July 2002 00:00 (twenty-three years ago)