What if there was a portal that made a copy of you

this thread is making me want to rewatch "The Prestige"

third point is a different but interesting debate, first two points are nailed-on otm

nothing, however, could make me want to rewatch the prestige. I wouldn't even ask a clone to do it.

1. Like you said, other thought experiments get at this question better so not so interesting here (much better version imho is the brain in a new body question) -- also since the problem was posed as split consciousness, you are simultaneously burning in sulfur and at your destination. the question of phenomenological split consciousness is potentially interesting, but i don't think this thought problem sheds any light on that particular element.

2. 'hard moral facts' is an ineloquent way of describing what i think is a (Parfit aided -- Rorty influenced) position that is part deontological + part utilitarian. from a deontological perspective it's morally clear bc you have the same ethical obligations to yourself as you do to others and I don't see how ownership mediates that in any meaningful way (not to mention that it opens a whole can of Marxist worms re self-ownership and abjection). from a utilitarian perspective, which is the only area where there's even something to discuss imo, the question then becomes whether the end good (a quick trip) is worth the price (someone -- probably you -- suffering in sulfur) and like i wrote above, i've never had a trip so bad that it can be equated to burning in sulfur. (of course someone might claim that just the existence of such a machine would be a tremendous scientific breakthrough, even if no one ever used it, and so it has value from existing even tho ethically it can never be used - or used only once to test it.)

I do worry that you're so quick to contextualize the question in terms of ownership - and I think my caveat for psychopaths accounts for that option, that in a Capitalist society if you own the clone than do whatever you want with it (and that maybe exercising your ownership is a kind of Randian ethics). Also, I had a write-in vote for 'paratext' in the text/subtext poll.

than=then typo

1. It wasn't presented as 'split conciousness' it was presented as 'seperate consciousness', ie not simultaneous. It's also different to whatever other question you keep wanting to answer, i dunno get over it?

2. The other someone is not you and dies instantly

Now answer the question!

It's not true! They don't die instantly, they suffer for 100 years!

i'd argue that the clone is net equal for the transaction and using the 'bird flying through from endless shadow to endless shadow through a lit room' analogy for life may even be better off.

Also

To clarify, consciousness at the point of teleportation splits into two, bacteria style. There's no choice involved; you as much go into the pit as get teleported.

How are you reading this? "You as much go into the pit as get teleported." If you are experiencing both, how can you conceptualize it as the other someone not being you? They're both you. The way I understand it:

You (A) before split becomes you in sulfur pit (B) and you at destination (C). Person A has been split. Person B and C no longer experience the same things as each other, but they are both you experiencing them. They are distinct from each other in the sense that they have a point (at the split) where they no longer share memories/experiences, but they are still both your consciousness.

i don't recall 100 years of suffering tbh

xp I think you don't understand the problem at all!

the other duplicate of you had to burn in a fiery pit of sulphur for like 100 years.

i think the ground keeps shifting here tbh, i was arguing on a very clear set of facts based on 'lol fuck you clone i'm outta here' and that appears to no longer apply.

I thought the point was that you got dumped in the pit but your clone ended up at the destination; I don't see the feasibility otherwise

lol feasability

we need the op back in here stat

I think he was very clear that you split consciousness and then experience both. That stipulation formed the basis of my skepticism of the value of such a thought experiment.

Of course if you're e.mily you believe that you can do whatever you want with your clone bc it belongs to you, which, idk, I'm reminded about Moten's whole shtick about the "commodity who speaks" (aka slaves)

one of you got transported to wherever you wanted to go, like, instantaneously, but the other duplicate of you had to burn in a fiery pit of sulphur post on ilx for like 100 years.

That would suck.

i prefer the version (and i'm pretty sure i saw robin hanson discussing it recently tho i couldn't refind it yesterday): you step into the transporter and a clone of you down to the last particle is recreated in the new location. the original body is disintegrated. his point was that this shouldn't be ethically different than your original body just transporting somewhere new, but that ppl will have more resistance to the first option than the second bc something appears to be destroyed and that something appears to be you. (this is putting aside any possibility of machine failure). also this ties into his whole thing about emulations -- he would actually be sympathetic to e.mily's point that any em's you create belong to you so you can do whatever you want with them. (Levinas would for sure have multiple problems w/ this.)

harsh on e.mily, mordy. Clones are pretty much always wankers.

I watched 'the prestige' for the first time last week, I sorta liked the first half but then...lol...

well, she said that i wasn't defending my position adequately, so i'm trying to demonstrate why i find her position so ethically untenable. it's not personal!

xp seems morally legit to me to do that. The destruction is only in appearance, there's not really a 'new' nor 'old' entity in any sense that i'd like to have to argue.

'ethically untenable' wtf cmon i know this is just for shits and giggles but ethics? Really?

What about the saving on carbon monoxides, then? Eh?

I don't see how you can say that. If you split in half and then half of you has 20 years of life experience -- marries, has children, works, creates art, etc -- and then at the end of the 20 years you decide to shut him down, how is that distinct from killing a non-clone?

Feel free to answer the question from whatever perspective you want! I personally find the ethical dimension the more interesting part.

i was responding to your 'particle swap' version there btw

oh, that was more about why someone might feel uncomfortable w/ being disintegrated. robin hanson is less interested in ethics than why ppl feel the way they do about stuff.

was he the youngest one?

mmmmbop

Ahh, this got going again, excellent.

a) I do feel the need to point out that the only question I really took a position on was the third - I'm not advocating the burning/ownership of your clone, I'm just suggesting that it's an interesting area to explore. As you have proved by engaging with it rather than dismissing it, Mordy, heh.

b) There's no choice involved; you as much go into the pit as get teleported.

I think this is being interpreted in different ways by people. Split/simultaneous consciousness = 'you x as much go into the pit as you x get teleported'. Split/separate consciousness = both yous are you, but you consciousness x go into the pit as much as you consciousness y get teleported. Both interpretations are valid from the sentence, but I think split/separate was backed up more by the original poster.

c) I don't actually have time for c as I have to get ready to go DJ, but I will come back to this tomorrow. Mordy's raised some good extra points here.